SPRING OFFENSIVE: FROM YALU TO SEOUL
China truly shocked the United Nations Command when it launched its first major offensive across the southern border in November 1950. By early December, PVA troops had pushed the front line back to the 38th parallel, while also recapturing the communist capital, Pyongyang, from American/South Korean forces. By January 1951, the third campaign had pushed the United Nations forces back to the 37th parallel, while Chinese troops also captured Seoul, the southern capital. Chinese morale was sky-high, the strategies employed so far had been successful, and the goal of finally driving UN forces out of the Korean peninsula seemed entirely realistic at this point. By the end of January 1951, the fourth Chinese offensive had begun, and by the end of it (spring 1951), the number of Chinese soldiers serving in Korea had reached 950,000, including 42 infantry divisions, 8 artillery divisions, 4 air defense divisions, and 4 tank divisions.
China truly shocked the United Nations Command when it launched its first major offensive across the southern border in November 1950. By early December, PVA troops had pushed the front line back to the 38th parallel, while also recapturing the communist capital, Pyongyang, from American/South Korean forces. By January 1951, the third campaign had pushed the United Nations forces back to the 37th parallel, while Chinese troops also captured Seoul, the southern capital. Chinese morale was sky-high, the strategies employed so far had been successful, and the goal of finally driving UN forces out of the Korean peninsula seemed entirely realistic at this point. By the end of January 1951, the fourth Chinese offensive had begun, and by the end of it (spring 1951), the number of Chinese soldiers serving in Korea had reached 950,000, including 42 infantry divisions, 8 artillery divisions, 4 air defense divisions, and 4 tank divisions.
PVA soldiers crossing the Yalu
These first four Chinese offensives shaped and laid the foundations for the Fifth Campaign, also known as the Spring Offensive. In this chapter, we will examine the military plans employed by the PVA and their preparation, organizational structure and execution, tactical decisions, communication, the resolution of problematic situations that arose during combat, and the performance of the Chinese Volunteer Army. The tactics initially employed were derived from the civil war years, in which massive waves of human waves were used against well-entrenched (and otherwise highly effective) nationalist forces. In the Korean War, the PVA used the same tactics against UN forces: mass assaults, flanking attacks, night raids, close combat, and complete encirclement to counter the extremely threatening artillery power of the UN forces (and their own almost complete lack thereof).
THE CHAIN OF COMMAND
THE CHAIN OF COMMAND
The PVA chain of command was established in October 1950 and remained in place throughout the Korean War, with Mao exercising operational control from Beijing. At the center of military operations, Mao made strategic decisions and campaign plans through telegrams sent to the PVA headquarters. Peng Dehuai and his staff carried out Mao's plans by tailoring individual operations, organizing forces, and executing battle plans, then sending daily reports to Mao on events at the front lines.
Mao and Peng
Peng issued detailed instructions to army commanders, and later, during the Spring Campaign, direct communication was established between the PVA headquarters and army commanders. When army commanders later ordered their divisions to carry out missions, the new chain of command did not really work in practice because it proved to be more personality-driven. During the Spring Campaign in the spring of 1951, there were several instances where a commander lost contact with his superior and the chain of command was broken. The relationship between Mao and Peng was not exactly smooth, and this unfortunately left its mark on various military operations: despite receiving Peng's reports and plans every day, Mao constantly and often suddenly changed or modified Peng's plans, naturally at the expense of the Korean PVA command. Peng's approach to the Korean War as a whole was decidedly cautious and conservative compared to Mao's, and arguably more realistic. Mao, placing political doctrine above strategic realities, forced Peng to launch one offensive after another against UN forces. Despite Mao's more than twenty years of experience in planning battlefield campaigns, his instructions to Peng allowed very little independent initiative on the part of the PVA command, which later came back to haunt him.
Although Mao dominated operational planning and took his role as commander-in-chief seriously, the PLA and PVA never adopted a command and control doctrine that met the requirements of modern warfare. Among Chinese officers, the command transmission system continued to operate through direct personal contacts rather than through official paperwork or other means, which significantly impaired the transmission of orders and the quality of their literal preservation. Within the PLA, personal relationships between commanders were very important, and Peng became frustrated every time he tried to implement Mao's unrealistic plans without the close supervision and personal support of army group and army commanders.
THE FIRST ENCOUNTER
From October 25 to November 7, 1950, Chinese forces attacked UN forces with continuous raids instead of the defensive campaign planned by Mao and Peng. Mao's plan was based on the assumption that the North Korean People's Army would be able to defend Pyongyang and slow down the UN forces' advance northward. At that time, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) hereinafter referred to as the NKPA) had a total of 250,000 men, including nine infantry divisions and one tank division in North Korea, nine divisions undergoing training in Manchuria, and the remnants of nine infantry divisions in South Korea. Establishing effective defenses in the areas controlled by the NKPA would have allowed the PVA to gain an advantage and gain a foothold in North Korea to stop the UN forces' northward advance. Attacking enemy forces or launching any kind of offensive campaign was never the main goal of either Mao or Peng, but during his meeting with Kim Il-sung on October 21, Peng Dehuai realized that Chinese intelligence was anything but accurate, with messages arriving at least two or three days late, which made it impossible for him to carry out Mao's plan to defend the 40th parallel.
PVA soldiers in October 1950, during the capture of Seoul
American soldiers after the battle of Unson
Although Mao dominated operational planning and took his role as commander-in-chief seriously, the PLA and PVA never adopted a command and control doctrine that met the requirements of modern warfare. Among Chinese officers, the command transmission system continued to operate through direct personal contacts rather than through official paperwork or other means, which significantly impaired the transmission of orders and the quality of their literal preservation. Within the PLA, personal relationships between commanders were very important, and Peng became frustrated every time he tried to implement Mao's unrealistic plans without the close supervision and personal support of army group and army commanders.
THE FIRST ENCOUNTER
From October 25 to November 7, 1950, Chinese forces attacked UN forces with continuous raids instead of the defensive campaign planned by Mao and Peng. Mao's plan was based on the assumption that the North Korean People's Army would be able to defend Pyongyang and slow down the UN forces' advance northward. At that time, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) hereinafter referred to as the NKPA) had a total of 250,000 men, including nine infantry divisions and one tank division in North Korea, nine divisions undergoing training in Manchuria, and the remnants of nine infantry divisions in South Korea. Establishing effective defenses in the areas controlled by the NKPA would have allowed the PVA to gain an advantage and gain a foothold in North Korea to stop the UN forces' northward advance. Attacking enemy forces or launching any kind of offensive campaign was never the main goal of either Mao or Peng, but during his meeting with Kim Il-sung on October 21, Peng Dehuai realized that Chinese intelligence was anything but accurate, with messages arriving at least two or three days late, which made it impossible for him to carry out Mao's plan to defend the 40th parallel.
PVA soldiers in October 1950, during the capture of Seoul
By this time, UN forces had advanced so far north that on October 19, the NKPA was driven out of Pyongyang and the entire communist defense collapsed in North Korea. Kim Il-sung was able to maintain communication with roughly 50,000 NKPA soldiers, making it impossible for Chinese divisions to complete their assigned task of occupying their defensive positions 193-290 km south of the Yalu River in time. However, the Chinese were helped by the fact that they successfully outmaneuvered American reconnaissance, so the UN forces had no idea that approximately 300,000 PVA soldiers had remained effectively hidden in North Korea for two weeks. This made Mao eager for blood, and he quickly changed his defensive strategy to an offensive one, based on the idea that the element of surprise would allow them to significantly weaken the American/South Korean forces before they could bring in further reinforcements.
The First Campaign launched by the PVA, which lasted from October 25 to November 7, 1950, was poorly planned, as UN forces moved much faster and reached much further north than the Chinese had anticipated. The four Chinese armies fought frontal battles with the Republic of Korea's 1st, 6th, and 8th Divisions and the US 1st Cavalry Division. During the first campaign, the PVA command concentrated 120,000-150,000 men in the area north of the Chongcheon-gang River, facing 50,000 UN troops, giving the Chinese a three-to-one numerical advantage. The PVA used combat tactics perfected by the PLA during the Chinese Civil War, such as surprise attacks, roadblocks to separate enemy units, and night attacks to compensate for the overwhelming small arms and artillery firepower of the UN forces. Nevertheless, the PVA failed to achieve its goal of eliminating at least two ROK divisions during the campaign.
The first encounter with the Americans was purely coincidental, when the Chinese 39th Army attacked Unson, believing it to be defended by South Korean forces. The Chinese only realized from the silhouettes unfolding before them that they were about to face American forces, but they were completely unprepared for the Chinese appearance: many believed that South Korean reinforcements were arriving, and so they tried to shake hands with the approaching Chinese. In the battle that lasted from November 1 to 4, the US 6th Cavalry Regiment and the Republic of Korea 12th Regiment of the 1st Division were decimated, suffering 2,000 casualties by the end of the battle.
The First Campaign launched by the PVA, which lasted from October 25 to November 7, 1950, was poorly planned, as UN forces moved much faster and reached much further north than the Chinese had anticipated. The four Chinese armies fought frontal battles with the Republic of Korea's 1st, 6th, and 8th Divisions and the US 1st Cavalry Division. During the first campaign, the PVA command concentrated 120,000-150,000 men in the area north of the Chongcheon-gang River, facing 50,000 UN troops, giving the Chinese a three-to-one numerical advantage. The PVA used combat tactics perfected by the PLA during the Chinese Civil War, such as surprise attacks, roadblocks to separate enemy units, and night attacks to compensate for the overwhelming small arms and artillery firepower of the UN forces. Nevertheless, the PVA failed to achieve its goal of eliminating at least two ROK divisions during the campaign.
The first encounter with the Americans was purely coincidental, when the Chinese 39th Army attacked Unson, believing it to be defended by South Korean forces. The Chinese only realized from the silhouettes unfolding before them that they were about to face American forces, but they were completely unprepared for the Chinese appearance: many believed that South Korean reinforcements were arriving, and so they tried to shake hands with the approaching Chinese. In the battle that lasted from November 1 to 4, the US 6th Cavalry Regiment and the Republic of Korea 12th Regiment of the 1st Division were decimated, suffering 2,000 casualties by the end of the battle.
American soldiers after the battle of Unson
The first large-scale clash did not take long to materialize. On November 27, 1950, 120,000 Chinese soldiers stormed the American forces stationed at the Chosin Reservoir. Despite the fact that the Americans put up a fierce resistance and fought back with everything they had, by December 2, Sihung-ni had fallen, bringing the battle for the reservoir to an end. I have already written about the battle for the Chosin Reservoir in a two-part article. If you are interested in more details, you can find them at the following links:
1. cikk: https://ghostdivision74h.blogspot.com/2025/02/battle-for-chosin-reservoir-part-1.html
2. cikk: https://ghostdivision74h.blogspot.com/2025/03/battle-for-chosin-reservoir-finale.html
After the Battle of Chosin, the Chinese leadership was elated, and despite their heavy losses (and the fact that the American X Corps had managed to escape), they considered the battle and the first campaign a victory.
They were all ready for the next major offensive.
The source I used for this article: Xiaobing Li: China's Battle for Korea
1. cikk: https://ghostdivision74h.blogspot.com/2025/02/battle-for-chosin-reservoir-part-1.html
2. cikk: https://ghostdivision74h.blogspot.com/2025/03/battle-for-chosin-reservoir-finale.html
After the Battle of Chosin, the Chinese leadership was elated, and despite their heavy losses (and the fact that the American X Corps had managed to escape), they considered the battle and the first campaign a victory.
They were all ready for the next major offensive.
The source I used for this article: Xiaobing Li: China's Battle for Korea
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