Battle for the Chosin reservoir. Finale: the Battle of Funchilin Pass and the evacuation at Hungnam

 

The battle for the Chosin reservoir ended and resumed with a rather hasty American retreat. After a brief respite, on 6 December 1950, the breakout was launched, led by the 7th Marine Division, to the south (Armchair Historian's previously published video provides a very good visual representation of both US and Chinese troop movements), with the 5th Marine Division forming the rear guard. At the same time, the slightly delayed 26th PVA Corps (76th and 77th Divisions) relieved the 58th and 60th Divisions at Hagaru-ri. While the 7th Marines pushed the 76th PVA Division south of Hagaru-ri, the 5th Marines took over the outskirts of Hagaru-ri and recaptured the East Hill from the 76th. In a last-ditch effort to stop the American breakout, the Chinese launched their usual night attack, with the 76th and 77th divisions attacking American positions on the outskirts of Hagaru-ri from all directions. The Marines successfully repelled the unrelenting Chinese attacks, inflicting heavy casualties.

Meanwhile, the 7th Marine Division successfully opened the Hagaru-ri-Koto-ri pass, occupying the high ground surrounding the road. As soon as the Marines withdrew from this high ground, the Chinese 77th PVA Division returned to the high ground and successfully attacked the American column. Total chaos broke out, serious clashes took place and the retreat slowed. The Marines fought off the Chinese forces in night fighting, and most of the PVA troops blocking the retreat route were eliminated. On 7 December, the last of the column managed to reach Kot'o-ri with some difficulty.

Troop movements of the retreating US forces (blue) and the attacking Chinese forces (red)

After the failure of the Chinese 26th Corps at Hagaru-ri, the PVA General Headquarters sent the 26th and 27th Corps to pursue the fleeing UN forces and the 20th PVA Corps to block the escape route. However, as most of the 20th PVA Corps had been destroyed in the Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri areas, the only significant Chinese forces between Kot'o-ri and Hungnam were the remnants of the 58th and 60th Divisions. In desperation, Song Shilun ordered these troops to dig in at the Funchilin Pass, while he blew up the only vital bridge in the area (40.232°N 127.296°E), hoping that the terrain and obstacles would allow the 26th and 27th Corps to catch up with the retreating UN forces.

The Watergate bridge on an american made aerial photo

Source for the previous two pictures: https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/americans-faced-blown-out-bridge-during-retreat-to-38th-parallel/

American units crossing the freshly repaired bridge

The 180th Regiment of the PVA, which had occupied Hill 1081 (40.233°N 127.326°E), then blew up the original concrete bridge and the two makeshift replacements the Americans had built afterwards in quick succession, and were then under the impression that the bridge had become beyond repair. In response, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Division, launched an attack from the south against the Chinese troops dug in on Hill 1081, and the hill was captured on 9 December. It was a bittersweet victory, because the PVA men literally fought to the last bullet and all of them died heroic deaths on Hill 1081.  At the same time, the 7th Marines and RCT-31 launched an attack on the bridge from the north, only to be met by Chinese defenders who froze to the death in their trenches like a group of ice-coiled statues. There were also instances of US Marines finding Chinese units that were still alive but could no longer move, so the Americans pulled them out of their trenches to start to 'thaw' somewhat. It was also common for Chinese soldiers to have their hands so frozen to their weapons that the American soldiers had to break their fingers to take their weapons.

Frozen PVA soldiers in their ambush positions

With the road to Hungnam still blocked at Funchilin Pass, the US 314th Troop Carrier Squadron used eight C-119 aircraft to drop parachute-borne bridge sections. The bridge, which consisted of eight separate sections 5.5 metres long and weighing 1,900 pounds (1,300 kg), was dropped one at a time, using a 15-metre parachute for each section. Four of these sections, along with additional wooden extensions, were successfully assembled by Marine Corps combat engineers and members of the US Army's 58th Engineer Company on 9 December into a replacement bridge, allowing UN forces to continue their advance south. The PVA's 58th and 60th divisions, although at a considerable disadvantage, continued to try to slow the retreat of the UN forces with ambushes and raids, but weeks of non-stop fighting left the two Chinese divisions completely depleted in both materiel and manpower, with only 200 troops remaining. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find exact figures for this (if I can in the near future, I will update this article), but if we take the full deployment (10,000 troops per division) of both PVA divisions in question from the point they crossed the Yalu River (19 October 1950), the total number of troops in each division was about 10,000. ) to the point where the Americans withdraw their last troops at Hungnam (11 December 1950), this represents a 99% loss of troops in practically 3 months..... The last UN forces left Funchilin pass on 11 December 1950.

EVACUATION AT HUNGNAM

The heavy cruiser USS Saint Paul fires its 8-inch (203 mm) guns at Chinese troops threatening evacuation

By the time the UN forces arrived at Hungnam, MacArthur had long since (on 8 December) ordered the evacuation of the US X Corps to reinforce the US Eighth Army, which by then was severely depleted and rapidly retreating towards the 38th parallel. Following his orders, the ROK I Corps, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment and the US 3rd and 7th Infantry Divisions also established defensive positions around the harbour. There were some exchanges of fire between the defending US 7th, 17th and 65th Infantry Regiments and the pursuing Chinese 27th PVA Corps, but against heavy naval gunfire from the US Navy's 90th Marine Corps, the badly battered 9th Corps was no longer in a position to approach Hungnam.

The USS Begor high-speed transport vessel observes the destruction of Hungnam's port facilities on 24 December

In what US historians have called "the largest naval evacuation movement in American military history", an armada of 193 ships gathered in the harbour and managed to evacuate not only the UN troops but also their heavy weapons and about a third of the Korean refugees. One of the Victory ships, the SS Meredith Victory, evacuated 14,000 refugees alone, despite being designed to carry only 12 passengers. The last UN unit left the country at 14:36 on 24 December, and the port was demolished to make it completely unusable by the Chinese. The PVA's 27th Army moved into Hungnam on the morning of 25 December.

CASUALTIES

According to official estimates published by the General Logistics Department of the People's Liberation Army in 1988, the PVA's 9th Army Corps suffered 21,366 casualties, including 7,304 dead. In addition, 30,732 non-combat casualties were attributed to the extremely harsh Korean winter and food shortages. The 9th Corps suffered a total of 52,098 casualties, more than a third of its initial total. Outside of official channels, the estimate of Chinese casualties was put at 60,000 by Patrick C. Roe, chairman of the Chosin Few Historical Commission, citing the 9th Corps' request for supplies after the battle to replenish its personnel. Regardless of the differing estimates, Yan Xue, a historian at the PLA National Defence University, noted that the 9th Corps was completely disabled for three months after the battle at the Chosin Reservoir (until March 1951 to be precise). With the absence of the 9th Corps, the Korean Chinese Army was reduced to 18 infantry divisions by 31 December 1950, compared to 30 infantry divisions present on 16 November 1950.

WINNERS OR LOSERS?

In fact, there are many researchers, many points of view, and many ways of interpreting what happened at the Chosin reservoir. To start with, both sides can claim a victory: the PVA's 9th Corps completely dominated the battlefield, while the X Corps was able to hold off the PVA's 9th Corps in a series of battles, allowing it to use them as effective tactical units to help withdraw a large part of its forces. It can also be seen as a kind of Chinese "geographical victory", because although the PVA did not achieve its goal of destroying the US 1st Marine Division, the X Corps was successfully driven out of North Korea. According to the official Chinese history textbook published by the PLA Military Academy of Sciences, despite the heavy losses, the PVA's 9th Corps earned the victory by successfully defending the eastern flank of Chinese forces in the Korean theatre of operations while inflicting more than 10,000 casualties on United Nations forces.

If we look at the events at the Chosin reservoir from the other point of view, the PVA's 9th Army was defeated because of its heavy losses and its inability to destroy the very understrength US/UN forces: the Chinese were able to deploy approximately 120,000 soldiers during the battle, while the US/UN forces were able to deploy approximately 30,000. Unfortunately, the battle affected the PVA in two ways, both of which had the result of helping the UN Command to stabilise their South Korean position, while at the same time losing North Korea for a time.
- Firstly, according to historian Shu Guang Zhang, the PVA commanders, under the influence of the victories at Chosin and Ch'ongch'on, were lulled into the completely false illusion that they were "capable of completely defeating the US armed forces" and this led to "unrealistic expectations of what miracles the PVA would perform in the future."
- Second, the sub-zero temperatures and heavy casualties caused by the fighting, coupled with poor logistical support, weakened the PVA's eight elite divisions of the 20th and 27th Corps to the point that the leadership was forced to disband two of these eight divisions completely. By early 1951, 12 of the 30 Chinese divisions in Korea were now missing, and heavy Chinese losses at the Chosin Reservoir allowed the UN forces to gain a firm foothold in southern Korea.

As we shall see later, this will have the fateful consequences of creating a kind of stand-off between the parties between July 1951 and July 1953, and from 1951 onwards the Chinese forces will no longer be able to launch counter-attacks as effectively and achieve as much success as they did up to the end of December 1950.

MOVIE RECOMMENDATION:

A Chinese action movie about the Battle of Watergate Bridge at Funchilin Pass has also been made, and this one is in many ways better than the previous Battle of Changjin Lake.....it is the second part of the series, and even if it is not perfect, it is well worth a Sunday afternoon with popcorn and nachos. Below you can watch the trailer: