Battle for the Chosin Reservoir, Part 1.

 

If there's one thing that can get me off studying military history from either side, it's the stupid, arrogant or even ignorant attitude of the high command to the combat situation and the resulting high number of soldiers killed. I have written before in articles introducing the Korean War that the sudden Chinese willingness to get involved was problematic at several points, I recommend reading an earlier article of mine in case anyone missed it: https://ghostdivision74h.blogspot.com/2024/01/koreai-haboru-3-hadsereg-allapota-1950.html

Whether or not the Chinese were justified in wanting to participate is open to debate on a number of points, but it is beyond dispute that there were some within the Chinese Communist Party who were completely out of their minds when they took seriously the fact that they were throwing whole divisions into the notoriously harsh Korean winters in thinner winter clothing for Chinese climates. There were, of course, a fair number of soldiers who were sent to Korea in summer clothing. It is clear that the war was sudden and that we had to react quickly, but this kind of attitude is devoid of any common sense. So it was with Commander Song Shilun's 9th Army Corps, who were the first to be thrown across the Yalu River from inside southern China to stop the United Nations forces. As the elite division of the Huaihai campaign during the civil war, the 9th Corps entered Korea with 120,000 troops, having undergone a major resupply, including two full divisions of former Nationalists who had surrendered during the civil war. They were sent into the grinders of the Korean War by the communist leadership, not only because they were tough, but also to ensure that as few of their class enemy elements as possible returned to China. Of course, there was later wonderment as to why the many PVA soldiers who were captured or surrendered had sought their placement in Taiwan rather than the People's Republic of China. On the day the 9th PVA Corps crossed the Korean border, 700 men suffered immediate, minor to major frostbite injuries and most of their transport vehicles were destroyed by the United Nations Air Force. There are many accounts of Chinese soldiers, half-dying from frostbite, who suffered frostbite en route, using their last strength to crawl to the side of the road to make way for their comrades marching after them.

Because of the hurry, the Chinese had no chance to take sufficient supplies of war material and food, so the soldiers had 5-6kg of rice each at the start. Outside estimates of Chinese casualties at the Chosin reservoir (Changjin Lake) were as high as 60,000, a casualty rate of nearly 50%. If you look at the Chinese estimates, you get essentially almost the same result: they recorded 7304 killed, 14062 wounded and 30732 casualties not attributable to firefighting. Essentially, on this basis, we can say that frostbite injuries alone incapacitated 1/4 of the Corps in a 17-day battle, most of which was fought in -38 (!!!) degrees Celsius, and that's not even talking about weapons and equipment rendered useless by frost.

IF YOU STOP, YOU FREEZE

Despite the extreme cold, the 9th Corps marched forward towards Changjin Lake as planned. The soldiers were disciplined in following all rules of concealment, and the absence of trucks allowed them to move through the deep snow at night without a hitch, eventually reaching the buffer zone completely undetected. They marched an average of 30 kilometres a day, for 18 days, without refuelling. A famous American military critic, Joseph Gurdon, praised the Chinese Volunteer Army's performance in the following words: "It is immaterial by what standard we look at the performance of the Chinese Communist Army, but the fact that they were able to carry out a forced march so successfully under such conditions speaks for itself!"

By this time, the Chinese had eaten almost all the food they had brought with them and could only eat frozen potatoes, while the Americans were overflowing with Thanksgiving Day delicacies. General Yu Yungbo, in a 2013 documentary, recalled his experience at Changjin Lake: "Our last remaining potatoes literally froze into ice cubes and were impossible to eat. We found out that while holding them in our hands, we would melt the ice off them with our breath, and in the same way we would try to heat the food layer by layer so that we could chew it at all." While the Americans slept in tents heated by small fireplaces, sleeping bags and covered in winter clothing, the Chinese had to lie in the open air in the snow, in temperatures of -40 degrees Celsius. They were not allowed to light a fire, as their positions would be immediately exposed. They dared not move, and they dared not sleep for fear that by dawn they would be the ones who would never get up again.

In December 1950, in the bitter cold, between snow-capped mountain peaks, ice-covered roads and windswept passes, this was the view the Chinese 9th and US 10th Corps faced. For the soldiers, sleepless nights, frostbite injuries, and on the verge of total physical and mental exhaustion, each firefight and ambush was an event beyond their wildest imagination. The terrain was more like a movie set in the Himalayan mountains than a terrain where a physical conflict could have been conducted within the boundaries of common sense. The commander of the US 1st Marine Division, Oliver P. Smith, described the place as 'a terrain in the mountains of North Korea that is definitely not designed for military conflict'. All his soldiers agreed without exception.

The Chinese, despite not having enough small arms, food, proper supplies and ammunition, kept pushing forward, and when one fell, dozens of others took its place. By the end of November 1950, the US 1st Marine Division and 31st Regiment were surrounded, severely depleted and on the verge of total annihilation. As the losses mounted, the American generals managed to find common ground: to avoid total disaster, they opted for a seaward break. China's 9th Army inflicted 13,916 casualties on the 1st Marines and 7th Infantry Division, setting a unique record in the history of the Chinese military for Chinese soldiers to disable an entire American regiment.

Commander Song Shilun recalled the battle: "The battle of Changjin Lake was even harder than the Great March! The cold made us more fearful than the enemy's bullets and artillery." Many soldiers' feet were so swollen from the cold that they were unable to put their shoes on after they had been removed, so when the bugle sounded, they charged barefoot through the snow. Many of them were so hungry they ate the snow by the handful to keep something in their stomachs. Many of them realised during the assault that their legs were so swollen that they could no longer feel them and fell to the ground, while others tried to attack by hopping on one foot. Those who could neither jump nor run, crawled towards the American positions with their weapons in hand, clenching their teeth and gathering their last strength.

An American veteran recalled the attack by the Chinese soldiers: 'There was a river near us, near the treelines, and our artillery was breaking up it's ice. It was a shallow river over ten meters wide, with a slow current. In the darkness, together with the bone chilling battlecries the ground was began to shake. The Chinese, heedless of our fire, waded across the river unabated, but as soon as they reached the shore, their thick winter trousers froze to ice with their feet. They could barely run, moving slowly towards our positions, their guns visibly frozen, for they barely returned any of the fire we directed at them. It was just one wave after another of them, and the fear we felt in those moments was unprecedented".

US General Alpha L. Bowser, many years after the Korean War, still with some fear in his voice, said, "I think the ice and snow of Changjin Lake and the relentless Chinese attacks have given us one more lasting, lifelong loss: nightmares that will never be removed from the hearts of the Marines who were there and lived through that battle."

DESTRUCTION OF A BATTALION OF THE POLAR BEAR REGIMENT

At midnight on 27 November 1950, the battle for Sinhung-ni Province began. Prior to the battle, the Chinese had not conducted a thorough enough reconnaissance because they had spotted only one battalion of soldiers: the legendary Polar Bear Regiment, formed during the First World War. Both in equipment and personnel and in its training, it was a modern corps, comprising 3 infantry battalions, 1 tank company, with a total of 3,191 personnel. Supplemented by the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment and the 57th Artillery Battalion, the three formed the 31st US Regiment Combat Team, now with over 4,000 personnel, 46 artillery batteries and 37 tanks.

The Americans were caught unawares by the attack, and they took up the fight with the Chinese forces that attacked them. Despite artillery and air support, after 5 days and 5 nights of desperate fighting, by 14:00 on December 2nd, Sihung-ni was captured by Chinese volunteers. The entire Polar Bear Regiment battalion was destroyed, including their commander, General McClean. The Chinese spoils of war included 184 vehicles, 11 tanks, 137 artillery pieces, 2,345 small arms, and during the battle they destroyed 7 tanks and 161 vehicles. It was an exemplary victory for the Chinese in terms of how to overcome enemy forces who were superior in almost every respect. The Polar Bear Regiment flag was collected from the site by volunteers and is now on display at the Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution in Beijing.